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An incentive fee is a reward structure that makes management compensation a function of 
investment performance relative to some benchmark. Incentive fees are often used to compensate 
the manager of investment assets. For example, hedge funds typically charge investors a fixed 
fee plus an incentive fee equal to between 5% and 25% of the fund’s annual return. Limited 
liability partnerships, such as commodity partnerships, real estate partnerships, and oil and gas 
partnerships, often charge incentive fees in excess of 20% of profits. There are a number of 
reasons why incentive fees are considered desirable. Perhaps the most often cited is that 
incentive fees align manager interest with investor interests. Both groups do better when the 
investment does better. Thus, the argument goes, management effort should be higher for funds 
with incentive fees. Closely associated with this is the argument that the best managers will 
gravitate towards investment pools that have incentive fees since they can make more money by 
managing such pools. The argument continues that since investors realize that funds with 
incentive fees draw the best managers and elicit the most effort, the investors are willing to place 
more money in these funds.1 
 While financial economists can and have theorized about the impact of incentive fees, 
there has been very little empirical analysis of the impact of such fees. The major reason is that 
incentive fees exist almost exclusively in industries such as hedge funds that not only don’t have 
audited data, but are not even required to systematically report data to a central agency. The data 
that exists are self-reported and subject to self-selection and survivorship bias.2 
 There is one industry that employs incentive fees that has audited publicly available data: 
the mutual fund industry. The funds that employ incentive fees in this industry make data 
available on the structure of the fees, the size of the fees each year, investment performance and 
the size of the assets under management. A second advantage of studying incentives for mutual 
funds is that these funds exist alongside mutual funds that don’t charge incentive fees. This lets 
us compare the performance of funds with and without incentive fees and thus gain insight into 
the impact of incentive fees.  
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 While these attributes constitute a major advantage of using mutual funds to study the 
impact of incentive fees, there is an additional attribute of fees for mutual funds that must be 
considered. Mutual funds by law must use a form of an incentive fee known as a “fulcrum fee.” 
The specifications of the fulcrum fee were laid out in a 1970 amendment to the Investment 
Company Act of 1940. According to the amendment, the incentive fee must be centered around 
an index, with increases in fees for performance above that index matched by decreases in fees 
for performance below the index.3 In addition, in practice the incentive component of fees 
always has an upper limit and a lower limit on size. These attributes are in contrast to the form of 
incentive fees employed by hedge funds and most private partnerships where the incentive 
component of fees is never negative, has a high watermark, usually use zero rather than an index 
as a reference benchmark, and is usually unbounded.4 In a later section we will show these 
differences are not as large as might be supposed, since fulcrum fees with limits as set by mutual 
funds can always be converted to an equivalent never-negative incentive fee. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the impact of incentive fees on mutual fund 
performance. The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section we examine the characteristics 
and the use of incentive fees in the mutual fund industry. In the second section we explore the 
theory of the effect of incentive fees on manager behavior. In the third section we discuss our 
data. In the fourth section we examine empirical results concerning fees earned, risk-adjusted 
performance, the effect of incentive fees on risk, and new cash flows into funds using incentive 
fees.  
I. The use of incentive fees by mutual funds. 
Incentive fees are not widely used by the mutual fund industry. In 1999, only 108 out of a 
total 6,716 bond and stock mutual funds used incentive fees.5 While incentive-fee funds 
represented only 1.7% of the total number of bond and stock funds, they held 10.5% of their 
assets. Furthermore, from 1990 to 1999, assets under management held by incentive-fee funds 
grew faster than assets for mutual funds in general. The size and growth of the assets under 
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management by funds using incentive fees makes a study of their impact on fund performance 
interesting in itself, as well as for the additional evidence it can provide on the impact of 
incentive contracts on managerial behavior. 
It is important to note that fund families with incentive fees have two basic organizational 
structures: they hire an outside manager or manage internally. In 1999, 27.4% of the funds with 
incentive fees employed outside managers. The remainder were managed internally. Some of the 
time this was done by employing a wholly-owned subsidiary, and some of the time the fund 
manager was a direct employee or partner in the fund family. Later we will show how this 
difference affects behavior. 
In 1999, the 108 funds that used incentive fees employed 43 different benchmarks, with 
the S&P 500 being the most popular (47 funds). Incentive fees are calculated on cumulative 
performance over periods ranging from three months to five years, with 12 months (45 funds) 
and three years (59 funds) being the most popular time spans. 
All mutual funds that use incentive fees have a fixed component of fees, as well as a 
variable component that must be symmetrical around a benchmark. In addition, every mutual 
fund caps the maximum negative amount of the variable portion of the fee, which limits the 
maximum as well as the minimum size of the fee since the variable portion of the fee must be 
symmetrical. For all existing funds, incentive fees have been set so that the total fees (fixed plus 
variable component) can never be negative. The incentive component of fees is either expressed 
as a continuous function of the difference between return performance and benchmark 
performance (78 funds) or the linear relationship is approximated by a discrete step function (30 
funds). In addition, incentive fees sometimes do not kick in unless performance has exceeded (or 
fallen short) of the benchmarks by a fixed amount. 
If we ignore the upper limit, a fulcrum fee can always be expressed as a never-negative 
incentive fee by subtracting the maximum differential return which earns a fee from the 
benchmark and subtracting the negative variable fee at the limit from the fixed fee. Consider a 
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fund with a one percent fixed fee. Now assume a variable fee of .10 to be applied to the 
difference between the fund performance and the benchmark performance up to a maximum 
difference of 4%. This can be expressed as a never-negative incentive fee by stating the fee as a 
60 basis point fixed fee plus a variable fee of 0.10 times the amount the fund outperforms a 
bogey set at 4% below the benchmark. Thus, the only difference between fulcrum and never-
negative fees is the existence of the upper limit on fees (in this example, 1.40%). This means that 
fee rates are always convex over the lower range of performance and are concave for funds that 
are performing really well.  
The rate of compensation for outperforming an index is much smaller for mutual funds 
than that found for other types of assets, e.g., hedge funds or commodity funds, but given the size 
of the assets under management it is large enough to be of real economic importance. For 
example, the five largest positive incentive fees for five different funds in our sample ranged 
from 11 to 58 million dollars, while the five largest negative fees ranged from 17 to 120 million 
dollars. The five largest incentive fees expressed as a percentage of the fixed fee were, on the up 
side, 50% to 73% of the fixed fee, while on the down side they were 64% to 99% of the fixed 
fee.  We should note one additional aspect of our analysis.  Our definition of incentive fee funds 
does not include those funds where investors pay a fixed fee but the portfolio manager has an 
incentive contract.  Thus, when we compare performance of funds where investors pay incentive 
fees to those without, some of the “without” comparison sample will have managers on incentive 
contracts.  This should reduce the probability of our finding significant differences between the 
two samples.6 
II. Implications of financial theory for management behavior. 
In this section we examine some of the implications for management behavior that arise 
from investment theory and the literature on incentive contracting. 
The theory of incentive contracting hypothesizes that incentive fees should elicit more 
effort on the part of portfolio managers. A second hypothesis is that firms with incentive 
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contracts should attract better managers, or at least not attract the poorest managers. If this is 
true, and if portfolio managers have differences in ability, then we would expect funds that have 
incentive contracts to have better real performance than funds that do not have incentive 
contracts. In addition, either because the investing public believes these hypotheses are true or 
because investors observe better performance for incentive fee funds, funds with incentive 
contracts should attract more new cash flow than funds without incentive contracts. 
Even if funds with incentive contracts do not attract managers with superior security 
selection skills, there are a number of ways managers can earn positive incentive fees with no 
selection ability. These techniques are not the type of behavior that is in the best interest of 
investors. The first two ways involve taking advantage of the lack of a risk adjustment in the 
incentive fee. 
One way to achieve a higher expected return than the benchmark with no security 
selection skills is to invest in non-benchmark assets that theory suggests or the managers believe 
will have a positive expected return. Assume a manager believes in either an APT model or that, 
as derived in Brennan (1993), stocks in a benchmark will have lower expected returns than non-
benchmark securities. Assume further the benchmark is the S&P 500 index. How could the 
manager take advantage of this? 
In either case the manager can expect to obtain expected return greater than the 
benchmark by taking exposure to indexes that he/she believes are rewarded with positive 
expected return. If it is a common stock fund benchmarked to the S&P 500 index, we would 
expect to find loadings on non-benchmark indexes such as a small-stock index, because they are 
believed to give a positive excess return and exposure to small stocks is not penalized in the 
reward structure. A similar strategy exists for bond funds. Switching into lower grade bonds 
would give a higher expected return, and the added risk in the form of sensitivity to common 
equity (see Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001)) is not penalized by the compensation 
structures.  
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A second way to outperform a benchmark on average with no selection skill is to have a 
beta greater than one with respect to the benchmark (or for bonds a duration greater than the 
benchmark). A beta greater than one will earn positive incentive fees with random security 
selection unless returns on the reference index are negative. Since the expected return on all the 
reference indexes are positive, a fund should have a beta greater than one. 
A beta greater than one has a second advantage. Because of the symmetry of fulcrum 
fees, a beta greater than one pre-fees results in a lower post-fee beta and higher alpha post-fees. 
Let 
iR  be the return on a fund before the variable fee is imposed 
F  be the variable fee 
BR  be the return on the benchmark 
 
Then the beta with the benchmark (post-fees) in the presence of a fulcrum performance fee is 
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 is the beta with the benchmark in the absence of a performance fee and would 
be the beta post-fees for a fixed management fee. 
 For funds with a beta greater than one before fees, fulcrum fees will reduce the beta, 
increase alpha above what it would be if the same average level of fee was paid as a fixed fee, 
and make the fund appear better in evaluation services.7 
 When we consider the shape of the incentive schedule, we gain additional insight into the 
way mutual funds with incentive fees might adjust risk to earn fees without selection ability. As 
discussed in a prior section, a fulcrum fee with limits can always be expressed as an equivalent 
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never-negative incentive fee. Since fees are a percent of assets, all one-period mutual fund 
incentive fees are monotonically increasing and convex up to the upper limit both because the 
fee itself rises and because the fee is applied to the starting asset base times the return. 
Furthermore, manager compensation depends not only on the structure of one-period fees, but 
also on how dollar fees and assets grow over time. As documented by Gruber (1996), Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Del Guercio and Tkac (2000), new fund 
inflows are highly correlated with a fund outperforming an index. Furthermore, funds 
underperforming an index experience outflows much smaller than the inflow of money to funds 
outperforming an index. This asymmetry in fund flows imposes a further convexity on the 
dollars of manager compensation. What do we know about manager behavior with a convex 
reward structure? 
First, most authors argue that, with never-negative incentive contracts, managers should 
engage in strategies that cause returns to have a high variance around the benchmark (see Das 
and Sundaram (2000), Carpenter (2000) and Cuoco and Kaniel (1998)). They argue that this 
strategy is optimal because underperforming the benchmark has less of an impact on dollar fees 
than does overperformance.8 Thus we should expect to see higher tracking errors for incentive-
fee funds than that for the typical mutual fund. 
While this should hold for the average manager, management behavior can vary 
depending on where on the incentive schedule their past performance places them. Managers 
who, because of poor past performance, are near the flat parts of the compensation schedule have 
a much more convex structure and an incentive to take high risk (see Carpenter (2000), Grinblatt 
and Titman (1989)). In addition, Das and Sundaram (1998), Cuoco and Kaniel (1998) and 
Carpenter (2000) argue that the manager should overinvest in the index and have a lower 
tracking error when the manager is sufficiently high on the rising part of the compensation 
schedule (to lock in gains) and that this tendency should be stronger the larger the incentive fee. 
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There is one more aspect of the impact of incentive fees which should be examined. As 
discussed earlier, mutual fund complexes employ both inside and outside managers. Inside 
managers are often principals or long-term employees of the firm. They are less likely to be 
replaced after poor performance than are outside managers.9 We would expect that this would 
allow them to take more risk than outside managers in order to earn higher fees. In addition, 
since inside managers are often principals in the firms designing the incentive system, they 
should be able to design an incentive contract that is easier to beat. 
For example, 18 of 28 external managers in our sample don’t earn positive fees unless 
fund returns exceed the benchmark by a specified amount, but for our sample funds that use 
internal managers, only 22 of 80 have this added hurdle. In addition, internal managers have 
incentive fees that increase faster as the portfolio manager outperforms the benchmark by larger 
amounts.  Finally, 20 of 80 funds with internal managers use a benchmark based on the 
performance of an average of actual mutual funds while all of the external managers use a 
security index as a benchmark. Since mutual fund returns are measured after expenses, and since 
actively managed funds on average have underperformed indexes, using an index of mutual fund 
returns as a benchmark makes the benchmark easier to beat. 
One justification for using incentive fees, especially for internal managers, is that it is a 
good marketing strategy. Investors could believe that funds using incentive fees attract better 
managers or are signaling they have better managers. In either case we would expect funds with 
incentive fees to attract more new inflows. 
In this section we have enumerated some of the characteristics of behavior we might find 
associated with mutual funds employing incentive fees relative to mutual funds not employing 
incentive fees. These are: 
1. Better stock selection ability (because of better managers). 
2. Sensitivity to other indexes (in addition) to the declared benchmark index. 
3. A beta with the benchmark index greater than one. 
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4. A higher tracking error. 
5. Greater risk-taking after a period of underperforming the benchmark. 
6. Less risk-taking after periods of outperforming the index. 
7. Greater increase in new cash flow.  
8. Inside managers should 
  a. Earn larger incentive fees than outside managers. 
  b. Take greater risk relative to outside managers. 
 
III. Data 
 Lipper provided us with data on which funds had incentive contracts, descriptions of the 
terms of the contracts, and actual fees paid by each fund in each year. These data were 
extensively cross-checked using individual fund prospectus, supplements to the prospectus, and 
phone conversations with individual funds. Our final sample ranged from a low of 40 funds in 
1990 to a high of 108 in 1999. 
 Return data came from Morningstar, as did many of the indexes. Additional indexes were 
obtained from Prudential-Bache, Datastream, and the producers of the indexes themselves. We 
identified and collected data on 41 different reference indexes used by the funds in our sample. 
For the four Sexton funds we were unable to obtain the benchmark indexes. We contacted 
Sexton, but they did not keep a record of the past values of their customized indexes or the exact 
way they were calculated, and thus we could not analyze these funds. This is an extreme example 
of a general problem. Consider the simplest index, the S&P 500 index. In almost none of the 
prospecti was it indicated whether dividends were included or not. Nor is the investor ever told 
whose S&P 500 index is being used. As discussed in Elton, Gruber and Blake (2000) or Pension 
and Investment Age (1986), there are differences in the S&P 500 price index depending on who 
calculates it, and adding dividends compounds the problem. Throughout we use the index with 
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dividends, if it is available. If an index is only available as a price index, then we use the price 
index as the reference index. 
 We also created a matched non-incentive-fee fund sample in order to draw comparisons 
with incentive fee funds. For each year we randomly selected for each fund with incentive fees 
four funds in the same ICDI category from the CRSP mutual fund data set that had three years of 
return data.10 In all tables this is the sample we compare to our incentive fee sample. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
In this section we will examine whether funds earn positive incentive fees, 
diagnose the return performance of funds with incentive fees, measure and diagnose the risk 
characteristics of funds with incentive fees, and examine new cash inflows to incentive-fee 
funds. When examining performance and risk, we will contrast the characteristics of funds with 
incentive fees with a sample of funds that do not employ incentive fees.  
 
A. Incentive Fees 
 Positive incentive fees should be important to a fund not only because beating a 
benchmark earns higher fees, but because of the inferences drawn by investors on the 
performance of the fund. Table I contains a summary of the actual incentive fees earned by all 
funds that have incentive fees and those earned by important subgroups of these funds. First note 
that, when we examine all funds in all years, on average they have earned a negative incentive 
fee of 0.006% of net assets per year.  The number of fund years where negative incentive fees are 
earned is about the same as the number of fund years where positive incentive fees are earned.  
In Table I and in all subsequent tables we include in the category “all funds” common stock 
funds, international funds, bond funds and balance funds. We do not separately report data on 
bond and balanced funds, since there are so few of them. There is a difference in fees earned 
among our two major subcategories. Common stock funds earn slightly negative incentive fees 
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that are significantly different from zero at the 10% level. More common stock funds have 
negative rather than positive incentive fees. In contrast, international funds have earned positive 
incentive fees on average, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Only 
international funds have been successful in either constructing benchmarks or managing money 
to benefit from such fees. 
 It is interesting to explore whether there are some funds that can consistently earn 
positive or negative incentive fees.  To examine this we employ a 2 by 2 contingency table.  In 
any year that we use as a base for predicting future incentive fees, we start by ranking all funds 
that charge an incentive fee calculated on a one-year basis.  We then divide the funds into top 
and bottom halves according to the ratio of incentive fees earned divided by total assets.  We find 
that funds that have high incentive fees in one period are almost twice as likely to have high 
incentive fees in the next period as they are to have low incentive fees.  Funds that have low 
incentive fees in one period are 1½ times more likely to have low incentive fees in the next 
period.  Using a standard analysis of variance test, these numbers are statistically different from 
zero at the one percent level. 
 Are there other ways of dividing the population of mutual funds that might give us 
insight into how incentive fees affect performance? Earlier we discussed the fact that incentive 
fees are paid to both internal managers and external managers. Firms that employ internal 
managers, many of whom are principals in the firm, select their own benchmarks and design 
their own fee structures. External managers are hired by a firm to manage a fund. As discussed 
earlier, external managers have much less control over the selection of the benchmark and the 
design of the fee structure. The empirical results (see Table I) support the value of control in that 
internal managers earn larger incentive fees than do external managers.11 However, the 
differences are small and only statistically insignificant at the 5% level for international funds. 
 Another way to categorize funds offering performance fees is by size of the fees. All the 
arguments concerning why funds with performance fees should outperform those without 
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performance fees work equally well when comparing funds with high fee schedules versus those 
with low fee schedules. When we grouped funds into high- and low-fee funds at several different 
performance levels on the fee schedules, we found no difference in the relationship between 
being a high- or low-fee fund and the size of incentive fees as a percent of total assets actually 
earned.12 The lack of a relationship between fee schedule and fees earned is consistent with funds 
that have incentive fees not earning positive incentive fees. 
 While the results reported in this study apply to incentive fee funds that existed in any 
year in our sample period we might learn some more about their behavior by examining funds 
that start incentive fees or stop using incentive fees during the ten years.  At the start of our 
period, 40 incentive fee funds existed.  Over the period, 86 new incentive fee funds started and 
18 stopped using incentive fees.  Of the 18 funds that stopped using incentive fees, all earned 
negative (poor performance) incentive fees prior to the time they dropped the fees.  Incentive 
fees called attention to this poor performance.  Of the 18 funds, performance was sufficiently 
poor that 6 were merged and 3 liquidated at or soon after they dropped incentive fees.  Of the 
nine funds that continued to exist after dropping incentive fees none changed managers but their 
average expense ratios increased by 16 basis points.  For those funds, clearly dropping incentive 
fees was a way to raise expense ratios and not have to report negative incentive fees. 
 
B.  Return Performance 
A fund can earn incentive fees relative to a benchmark by following a strategy of holding 
asset classes different from the benchmark and/or achieving good stock selection. For example, 
many funds that have the S&P 500 index as their benchmark hold portfolios of small stocks. For 
these funds, whether the fund earns incentive fees or not is likely to be determined primarily by 
the performance of small stocks relative to large stocks rather than by managerial skill.13  We 
start by examining security selection ability. 
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1. Security Selection Ability 
The issue we will address in this section is whether the funds that have incentive fees 
demonstrate superior security selection ability. To do this we remove the effect on performance 
of security types not in the fund’s benchmark which the fund might hold. For each fund we 
measured excess risk-adjusted return (alpha) from a multi-index model where one of the indexes 
was the fund’s stated benchmark index. For common stock funds we included, in addition to the 
benchmark index, the following indexes unless they were redundant given the benchmark index: 
the S&P 500 index, an index of the return on small stocks minus the return on large stocks, the 
return on growth stocks minus the return on value stocks, a bond index, and an international 
index. The first four indexes were included because they have been shown to capture the 
variance/covariance structure of fund returns.14 Two indexes need special discussion: the bond 
index and the international index. Many funds with common stock as their objective hold bonds. 
If a bond index is left out, returns on bonds above the risk-free rate are impounded in alpha. In 
addition, many of the domestic common stock funds held some international stocks.  
For bond funds we used the benchmark index plus the following indexes unless they were 
redundant: a government corporate bond index, a mortgage-backed bond index, and a high-yield 
bond index.15 Finally, the indexes for international funds are the benchmark index plus the 
following indexes, unless they are redundant: the S&P 500 index and the MSCI indexes for 
Europe, Japan, Pacific and Emerging Markets. If the benchmark for a fund was MSCI EAFE, 
Europe or World, creating a redundancy, Europe was dropped. 
 All returns were measured in excess of the risk-free rate (as measured by the 30-day T-
bill rate) unless the index itself was the difference in return between two portfolios. In all cases 
excess risk-adjusted return (alpha) was determined by estimating the betas from a regression of 
fund returns on multi-index returns over three years including as the last year the year in which 
the fund was being evaluated. From these regressions, betas (the sensitivity of the fund to each 
index) were estimated. These betas were then used in the year of evaluation to compute the 
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funds’ multi-index alpha for that year. Table II shows the multi-index alpha for the funds with 
incentive fees.  
 The multi-index alpha across all funds was a positive 0.048% per month. Overall, funds 
with incentive fees show positive stock selection ability that is significantly different from zero 
at the 5% level. The difference in alpha between funds that have incentive fees and funds that do 
not is 0.084% per month, which is economically significant and is statistically significant at the 
1% level.16 For common stock funds and international funds, the results are similar. The signs 
are the same, and most of the results are economically and statistically significant. 
 While we initially attribute this better stock selection to more effort or better managers, 
we have to be careful and take one more step in the analysis. We know that one of the key 
factors affecting performance is the size of expense ratios. Performance is measured after 
expenses. Perhaps funds that employ incentive fees have better alphas because they charge lower 
expenses. To examine this we compared the expense ratios for all funds in both our incentive- 
fee sample and our non-incentive-fee sample. As shown in Table III, across the entire sample, 
funds with incentive fees have expenses that are lower by 0.036% a month than funds without 
incentive fees. Furthermore, the differences are significantly different at the 1% level. 
 In Table III we also present the difference of the incentive-fee alpha from zero, corrected 
for differential expenses, and the difference of the corrected alpha from the alpha for non-
incentive-fee funds. In both cases, incentive-fee funds do better. However, after adjusting for 
differential expenses, the difference of incentive-fee fund returns from a portfolio of indexes 
with the same risk, while positive, is not statistically significantly different from zero. If funds 
with incentive fees charged the same higher expenses that were charged by other actively 
managed funds, they would do only slightly better than a portfolio of indexes with the same 
risk.17 
 When we compare incentive-fee funds with actively managed non-incentive-fee funds, 
even when we adjust the return on incentive fee funds for differential expenses, the results are 
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much stronger. Incentive-fee funds show better stock selection ability, and the results are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. In conclusion, for the overall sample just over half of the 
ability of incentive-fee funds to outperform non-incentive-fee funds is due to superior security 
selection, while the rest is due to charging lower expenses. 
 In Tables II and III we also analyze the difference in performance between incentive-fee 
funds that use internal and external managers. The results are quite clear. From Table I we see 
that funds with internal managers earn larger fees than funds with external managers. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis of internal managers setting their own reimbursement rather than 
negotiating with an outside agent.  In Tables II and III, whether we do or do not correct for 
differential expenses, internal managers show better stock selection performance than external 
managers, though the differences are only statistically significant at the 5% level when 
differential expenses are corrected.  One possible explanation is differences in the ability to 
attract managers. Potentially, external managers have the incentive-fee structure imposed on 
them, and internally managed funds use the fee structure to attract managers. Even with higher 
expenses the investor is better off investing in incentive-fee funds with internal managers than in 
those that use external managers.  All of the tables involving comparisons between incentive fee 
funds and non-incentive fee funds were repeated where a non-incentive fee sample was selected 
matched in size as well as the policy of the fund.  For this comparison, we paired each incentive 
fee fund with another fund with the same objective but closest in size.  This resulted in a much 
smaller sample of non-incentive fee funds (531).  All of the results shown in the tables remained 
essentially the same except for differential expenses and differential adjusted alpha in Table III.  
When corrected for size, the differential expenses are much lower, for example, changing from  
–0.035% to –0.015% for the entire sample from –0.037% to –0.018% for the common stock 
sample.  The differential adjusted alpha also changed less from .048% to .033% for the entire 
sample.  However, the conclusions reached above are unchanged.  We do not discuss the 
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comparisons with the size-matched sample in other tables because the magnitude of the numbers 
as well as the conclusions, are virtually the same.   
 Let us step back for a moment and reconsider return performance. We started out 
considering the incentive fees earned by funds that used them, and found that the incentive 
component of fees for all intents and purposes was zero. In Table IV we show that, consistent 
with this finding, the differential return (fund return minus benchmark return) is also close to 
zero. Yet funds with incentive fees had both lower expenses and greater stock selection ability 
than other funds. Where did the alpha go? There are two components of return that could explain 
this difference: beta levels or bets taken on other indexes. 
 In Table IV we show that, at least for the overall sample, the changes in return due to bets 
on factors other than the firm’s benchmark (e.g., size, value) are approximately zero.18 The big 
difference, the big giveback of return, by management of funds with incentive fees is from 
having betas with their benchmark less than one. For example, 4.6 of the 4.8 basis points of 
excess risk-adjusted return is given up by having an average beta of .952. 
 It is surprising that management runs these funds with a beta less than one with respect to 
the benchmark when benchmark indexes are expected to, and indeed did, have a positive excess 
return over the period of our study.  As discussed in the next section, managers have significant 
exposure to non-benchmark indexes.  The low beta might, in part, be due to the presence of these 
non-benchmark assets in the portfolio.  In addition, note that the betas on these funds are higher 
than the average betas for funds with no incentive fees (See Table V). However, since betas can 
be easily managed with the use of futures, it is surprising to find the betas less than one. 
 When we examine common stock funds and international funds separately, we see some 
differences. For international funds, the sector bets, in this case country or region bets, do seem 
to have a positive contribution to return. 
 When we examine internal versus external managers, we find a consistent story. Internal 
managers have better returns because they have better selection ability, they have higher (close 
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to one) betas, and they make better bets on other factors. While we will discuss this in greater 
detail in the next section, the results are consistent with two influences: 1) internal managers 
have designed their benchmarks to make them look better, and 2) internal managers are willing 
to take on more risk because they have more job security. 
 
C. Risk 
 Incentive-fee funds can expose investors to added risk, either because they have higher 
risk than non-incentive-fee funds on average or because they change risk as a response to prior 
performance, and this results in high risk over short periods. Each of these issues will be 
discussed in turn. 
 
1. Risk Over Time 
 Funds with incentive fees have a declared benchmark. Investors in these funds should 
logically expect that the funds follow strategies that are consistent with the benchmark. For 
example, if a fund’s benchmark is a mid-cap index, investors should expect that the fund invests 
in mid-cap stocks.19 Earlier we discussed the hypothesis that incentive fees might cause 
managers to follow investment strategies that had higher risk and that were inconsistent with 
their declared benchmark. This behavior is a source of risk to the investor. Whether funds 
actually follow these hypothesized strategies will now be examined. 
 The first hypothesis was that incentive fee funds should track a benchmark less closely 
than non-incentive-fee funds because of their more convex reward structure. We have two 
measures of this. First, Table V shows the average R2 on the benchmark regressions for 
incentive-fee funds and the difference between the average incentive-fee R2 and the average R2 
for the matched sample of non-incentive-fee funds, using style analysis to determine which index 
they most closely follow.20 As shown in Table V, incentive-fee funds have a statistically lower 
R2 than the matched sample. Furthermore, many of the R2s for incentive-fee funds are 
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surprisingly low. The average value is 0.80. For 25% of the funds the R2s are below 0.7 and for 
six percent of the funds the 2R are below 0.5. Nine R2s are actually below 0.25. 
Our second measure, a direct measure of tracking error, is the fund variance around the 
benchmark return. If we use the variance of deviations from the benchmark as a measure of 
tracking error, we see that incentive fee funds have a statistically higher unexplained variance 
relative to the benchmark. These results are consistent with incentive-fee funds increasing 
deviations from the benchmark in order to take advantage of a convex reward structure.  
The overall differences in R2 and tracking error variance are primarily caused by the 
common stock fund category. For this category of funds, the average R2 is statistically lower and 
the average variance of deviations from the benchmark is statistically higher for the funds with 
incentive fees versus the sample of non-incentive-fee funds. The difference in 2R and tracking 
error variance is extremely small and not statistically significant when we compare the incentive 
fee sample and non-incentive-fee sample for international funds. 
 Earlier we discussed why we would expect different tracking error for inside and outside 
managers. All incentive-fee-fund managers should have larger tracking error to take advantage 
of a convex incentive structure. However, this carries a greater risk of termination to an outside 
manager. Thus we would expect an outside manager to have lower tracking error variance than 
an inside manager. From Table V we see that outside managers have lower tracking error 
variance than inside managers overall and for each type of fund, and that most differences are 
statistically significant. 
 The second strategy an incentive-fee fund might follow to outperform its benchmark is to 
have a high beta. This would mean a higher systematic risk to an investor. As shown in Table V, 
incentive-fee funds have a much higher beta than non-incentive-fee funds. The differences are 
statistically significant at the 1% level for every sample. Nevertheless, they are still surprisingly 
low given the advantage a beta greater than one would have on fees. As shown in Table V, the 
average beta with the benchmarks is less than one. It is 0.96 for common stock funds and 0.87 
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for international funds. Overall, 46% of the funds have betas greater than one. Only 48 out of 
531 fund years have betas greater than 1.2, while 118 have betas less than 0.80. 
 One of the strategies a fund can follow is to attempt to outperform a benchmark by taking 
exposure to additional systematic factors that are priced. For example, if one believed in a 
multifactor APT model, one of the factors was small stocks, the benchmark was the S&P 500 
index and the small-stock factor had a positive risk premium, the fund could take exposure to 
small stocks. This is clearly a strategy followed by a large number of common stock funds with 
performance fees. For 228 out of 411 fund years we can reject at the 0.01 level the hypothesis 
that their investment policy is captured by their benchmark index.  The most frequent strategy for 
common stock funds is to be much more heavily exposed to small stocks than to their benchmark 
indexes. In 192 out of 411 fund years, common stock funds have a statistically significant 
exposure to small stocks at the 5% level even when their benchmark is included in the regression 
in addition to the small stock index.  
The next most common strategy for stock funds is to have a much higher exposure to 
value or growth stocks than to their benchmark indexes. At the 5% significance level, 35% of the 
fund years show a growth exposure, and 16% a value exposure. At the 5% level of significance, 
15% of the domestic stock funds have exposure to international indexes. Finally, at the same 5% 
level, about 8% of the domestic funds have significant exposure to bonds. 
In roughly 70% of the fund years, international funds have different exposure across 
sections of the world compared to their benchmark indexes. This differential exposure for 
international funds is generated by a different belief than for domestic funds. For domestic funds 
one can make equilibrium arguments of why a strategy of differential exposure might be 
expected to produce excess returns. For international funds, these equilibrium arguments are 
more difficult and differential exposure must primarily be justified by specific forecasts of 
different returns in various sectors or by an attempt to lower risk. 
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The exposure to other indexes has real economic consequences for investors’ risks. The 
average absolute value of the change in alpha due to taking exposure to other sources of return 
beyond the benchmark index averages 39 basis points. Since more funds use the S&P 500 index 
as a benchmark than any other benchmark, these funds were examined separately. The difference 
for these funds average 45 basis points per month. This is another indication that a lot of funds 
that use the S&P 500 index as a benchmark have substantial exposure to other factors. On the 
other hand, the average differential return from exposure to other indexes earned in all fund years 
was very close to zero. This indicates that while the exposure of funds to other indexes has a 
significant impact on the performance of individual funds, this exposure does not improve the 
performance of the average fund. These results are consistent with funds believing that they can 
beat the benchmark by taking bets on other indexes but not, in fact, making bets that have on 
average either a positive or negative payoff. 
 
2. Changing Risk 
As discussed earlier, the literature on incentive fees implies a differential risk posture 
depending on past performance. A manager who performs badly relative to the benchmark over 
the first part of a performance period has an incentive to take advantage of the greater convex 
shape of the payoff schedule in this range by increasing risk and thus having higher levels of 
expected return, while one who is performing well is near to concave portion of the payoff 
schedule and has an incentive to decrease risk in order to lock up the positive incentive fee.  
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) have shown that because fund flows are a function of performance 
we should also see this type of risk taking behavior for funds without incentive fees.  The issue 
we need to examine is whether the added convexity of incentive fees causes more extreme 
behavior for funds with incentive fees. 
 To test this we examined the performance of incentive fee common stock funds that 
employed a 36-month evaluation period and contrasted this with the sample of non-incentive fee 
22  
funds described earlier in the paper.21 We assumed that the manager would reexamine his or her 
position with respect to incentives at the end of 24 months and take a position with respect to risk 
over the next twelve months (the remaining year over which the incentive is computed).22 
 In each year from 1990 to 1999 we examined the previous 24 months of data for all funds 
with incentive fees. Based on the first 24 months, funds were ranked according to the size of the 
difference between their return and the benchmark return. The 20% of the funds that had 
outperformed the benchmark by the largest amount were placed in Group 1 while the 20% of the 
funds with the worst performance were placed in Group 2. For each of the groups the average of 
the variance around the benchmark index was computed for the next 12 months. In addition to 
examining this metric directly, we examined this metric divided by the variance around the index 
for the previous 24 months. The first statistic measures whether funds have a risk posture that 
conforms to theory while the second measures whether the fund changes risk in the direction 
specified by theory.  We examine the same measures for the sample of funds that did not use 
incentive fees.  Since these funds do not have a stated benchmark, we used as a benchmark the 
common stock index with which each fund was most highly correlated.  The results are presented 
in Panel A and B of Table VI. 
Clearly, incentive fee funds that have had a 24-month performance below the benchmark 
follow a strategy of having a higher variance around the benchmark in the next year than does 
the average fund employing incentive fees. Similarly, funds that had performance above the 
benchmark show a much lower variance from the benchmark than other funds. The difference in 
variance between these two groups was statistically significant at the 1% level. When we 
examine changes in risk posture with respect to the index rather than level, we also get very 
strong results. While the variance of the average funds were increasing over the period, funds 
that had good performance showed an increase in variance less than 1/7 the size of the increase 
for the average fund. Funds in the lower one-fifth of performance had an increase in variance 
around the benchmark almost one and one-half times that of the average fund. These differences 
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were only statistically significant at the 10% level.  Examining Panel B of Table VI shows that 
for funds that did not employ incentive fees, risk in the subsequent 12-month evaluation period is 
actually higher for funds that had previously done well than it is for funds that have previously 
done poorly.  In fact, the difference between the top and bottom 20% is close to zero and not 
statistically significant.23  When we examine the percentage increase in variance we find that 
non-incentive fee funds changed risk in the same direction as incentive fee funds, but the 
differential increase, while statistically significant at the 10% level, is only slightly more than 
one-third of the size of the difference for incentive fee funds.   
 This analysis was repeated by dividing the 36-month period into two equal length  
periods. Although not reported in Table VI, the results were even stronger.  For incentive fee 
funds the difference between the top and bottom quintiles was significant at the 1% level for 
variance and at the 5% level for the change in variance.24  For non-incentive fee funds the 
difference between the quintiles is positive rather than negative for average variance.  While it 
has the right sign for change in variance, it is very small compared to incentive fee funds and it is 
not significant even at the 10% level.  From this analysis, we can see that while the effect of 
returns on cash flows leads to a pattern of risk taking as described by Chevalier and Ellison, the 
use of incentive fees magnified the extent of inter-temporal risk shifting in an economically 
significant way. 
 
D. Attracting New Flows 
One of the reasons a fund might wish to have incentive fees is that its management 
believes that funds with incentive fees attract more new cash inflows. Thus funds might impose 
incentive fees as a marketing strategy. 
To examine the growth in new cash flow due to employing incentive fees, it was 
necessary to adjust for the impact of other influences that might affect new cash flow. For 
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example, funds that employed incentive fees could have grown faster than funds that did not, 
because their performance was better. 
In order to incorporate the impact of other influences into the cash flow analysis we 
employed the model developed by Sirri and Tufano (1998). We follow Sirri and Tufano in 
defining the rate of growth due to new cash flows as the rate of growth in net asset value minus 
that part of growth that would arise from the reinvestment of all dividends and capital gains. Sirri 
and Tufano estimate the growth in net new flows as a function of past total net assets, expenses, 
standard deviation of return, past returns, and the growth rate of new money into funds with the 
same investment objective. We duplicated Sirri and Tufano’s regression with exactly their 
definition of each variable and with the addition of a dummy variable to indicate whether the 
fund charged an incentive fee or not.25 We ran the regression separately for years 1997, 1998 and 
1999 and a combined regression for the three years with dummy variables for the years 1997 and 
1998. The sample was all funds listed by ICDI as aggressive growth, growth and income and 
long-term growth, having $15 million in net assets, and included in the CRSP database. This is 
the same sampling procedure used by Sirri and Tufano. The results for the combined regression 
are shown in Table VII. 
 Note that the results are broadly consistent with those reported by Sirri and Tufano. In 
addition, the incentive fee dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. When 
the regression was performed for each year separately (results not shown), the incentive-fee 
dummy was positive in all three years and significant at the 5% level in two out of the three 
years.  We also reran this analysis with a continuous rather than discreet measure for incentive 
fees.  We used the dollar incentive fee earned by a fund over assets as a measure of the size of 
the incentive fee.  Recall that the regression already contains variables to measure past 
performance so this measures the impact of the size of incentive fees earned with performance 
held constant.  The measure of the size of the incentive fee earned has no discernable effect on 
cash inflows (T-valued 0.3) while the existence of incentive fees has a statistically significant 
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positive effect on cash flow.  This is consistent with the existence of incentive fees being a signal 
to the market separate from performance or the magnitude of the fee earned. 
 This is strong evidence that the presence of incentive fees is attractive to investors. It 
provides one explanation of why funds might choose to voluntarily use incentive fees. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 The use of incentive fees by mutual funds has not previously been studied. The fact that 
10% of the assets under management by bond and stock funds are managed by funds with 
incentive fees attests to the importance of these funds in the mutual funds industry. In examining 
the impact of incentive fees on the mutual fund behavior, we can draw on the growing theoretical 
literature of the impact of incentive fees on managerial behavior to form hypotheses about their 
expected impact. This helps us to understand what aspects of mutual fund behavior to examine 
and allows us to perform one of the first empirical tests of incentive-fee theory. 
 What have we learned about mutual fund behavior for funds with incentive fees? Funds 
that employ incentive fees do not, on average, earn positive (or negative) incentive fees. 
However, internal managers seem to have more control over the design of the incentive system 
than do external managers, and so they earn slightly larger incentive fees. 
 Incentive fees are supposed to attract managers who are more skilled or will exert more 
effort than those who are attracted to funds without incentive fees. In fact, funds with incentive 
fees exhibit better stock selection ability than funds without incentive fees. Funds with incentive 
fees also have lower expense ratios than funds without incentive fees. Thus the fund holder 
benefits from two influences: better stock picking ability and lower expenses.  Given the positive 
risk adjusted return, why don’t incentive fee funds earn positive incentive fees?  Funds with 
incentive fees have, on average, a beta less than one.  When a benchmark has positive excess 
return, a beta less than one results in performance less than the benchmark.  Thus, even though 
incentive fee funds have positive excess return, they do not, on average, outperform their 
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benchmark because of the underperformance relative to the benchmark caused by a beta less than 
one. This is one of the big puzzles of the actions of funds with incentive fees. The simplest 
strategy for outperforming an index with an expected positive return is to have a beta greater 
than one. We should note that while the beta on incentive fee funds is less than one, it is greater 
than the beta for funds which don’t use incentive fees. The best way a manager without selection 
ability can hope to increase return after setting beta levels is by making bets on types of 
securities not included in the benchmark. Managers of funds with incentive fees make such bets 
because they believe they can benefit from them, but on average these bets have no impact on 
returns. 
 Moving from a discussion of return to risk, we find that incentive fee funds take more 
risk than non-incentive-fee funds on average, and that they increase risk after a period of poor 
performance and decrease it after a period of good performance. 
 What does all this mean for the investor? The sophisticated investor is better off buying 
funds with incentive fees than buying funds with no incentive fees. Risk-adjusted return is higher 
because of better management performance and lower expenses. However, the investor should 
realize that residual risk is higher with these funds. Incentive-fee funds do not track their own 
benchmark as closely as non-incentive-fee funds track the index they most closely follow. 
Furthermore, risk is likely to increase at the very time that returns are poor. 
 How does the market judge this combination of risk and return? It likes it, for cash flows 
into incentive funds are greater than cash flows into non-incentive funds.  
 In closing, a word of caution is in order. While at this time funds with incentive fees 
seem to offer superior performance to other actively managed funds, we don’t know whether this 
is true because of the motivation supplied by incentive fees or because skilled managers adopt 
incentive fees to advertise their skills to the public. 
This table shows, for the years 1990 - 1999 and for various categories of funds using incentive fees, the average incentive fee
earned expressed as a percentage of total net assets, as well the number of positive and negative incentive fees earned by the funds in
each category. Internal/external advisor status was not available for some funds. All tests are on differences from zero, and all
tests are 2-tailed tests except for the tests of differences in means between internal and external managers, where we hypothesize
that internal managers will earn higher fees than will external managers.
* = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 10% level.
Category Obs # Pos. # Neg.
All Funds 519 -0.006% 234 232
All Funds; Internal Advisor 366 0.000% 174 160
All Funds; External Advisor 98 -0.015% *** 43 47
Difference In Means (Internal - External) 0.015% ***
Common Stock 400 -0.015% *** 168 186
Common Stock; Internal Advisor 289 -0.010% 132 130
Common Stock; External Advisor 64 -0.020% 25 33
Difference In Means (Internal - External) 0.010%
International 86 0.031% * 51 32
International; Internal Advisor 62 0.038% * 36 25
International; External Advisor 16 0.000% 9 5
Difference In Means (Internal - External) 0.038% **
TABLE I
AVERAGE INCENTIVE FEES EARNED AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL NET ASSETS
Avg. Inc. Fee
As % Of TNA
This table shows, for various categories of funds, the average performance (the average of multi-index-model alphas) for the incentive-fee
sample as well as the differential alpha (incentive-fee-sample alpha minus matched non-incentive-fee sample alpha). Across all the
non-incentive-fee funds, the average alpha was -0.036%, which was significant at the 1% level. Reported significance levels for differences
in alpha are based on one-tailed tests; all other significance levels, including all of those for differences in means between internal
and external advisors, are based on two-tail tests.
* = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 10% level.
Category Obs
All Funds 531 0.048% ** 0.084% *
All Funds; Internal Advisor 372 0.068% ** 0.109% *
All Funds; External Advisor 103 0.027% 0.047% **
Difference In Means (Internal - External) 0.041% 0.062%
Common Stock 411 0.040% *** 0.080% *
Common Stock; Internal Advisor 295 0.055% *** 0.104% *
Common Stock; External Advisor 68 0.033% 0.047%
Difference In Means (Internal - External) 0.022% 0.057%
International 87 0.127% ** 0.141% *
International; Internal Advisor 62 0.173% ** 0.180% **
International; External Advisor 17 0.054% 0.076%
Difference In Means (Internal - External) 0.119% 0.104%
TABLE II
MULTI-INDEX PERFORMANCE (ALPHA)
Alpha For
Incentive-Fee
Funds
Difference In Alpha
(Incentive-Fee Apha Minus
Non-Incentive-Fee Alpha)
This table shows differential expense ratios (incentive-fee-sample expense ratios minus matched non-incentive-fee sample expense ratios),
adjusted alpha for the incentive-fee sample (incentive-fee-sample multi-index alpha plus differential expense ratio) and differential
adjusted alpha for the incentive-fee sample (incentive-fee-sample expense-adjusted alpha minus the average matched non-incentive-fee
sample alpha). Reported significance levels for differential adjusted alphas are based on one-tailed tests; all other reported significance levels,
including all of those for differences in means between internal and external advisors, are based on two-tail tests.
* = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 10% level.
Differential Adjusted Differential
Category Obs Expenses Alpha Adjusted Alpha
All Funds 531 -0.036% * 0.012% 0.048% **
All Funds; Internal Advisor 372 -0.034% * 0.034% 0.075% *
All Funds; External Advisor 103 -0.054% * -0.027% -0.006%
Difference In Means (Internal - External) 0.020% * 0.061% 0.081% **
Common Stock 411 -0.037% * 0.004% 0.044% **
Common Stock; Internal Advisor 295 -0.037% * 0.019% 0.067% **
Common Stock; External Advisor 68 -0.054% * -0.021% -0.007%
Difference In Means (Internal - External) 0.017% * 0.040% 0.074%
International 87 -0.037% * 0.090% 0.104% **
International; Internal Advisor 62 -0.026% * 0.147% *** 0.154% **
International; External Advisor 17 -0.090% * -0.035% -0.014%
Difference In Means (Internal - External) 0.064% * 0.182% *** 0.168%
TABLE III
DIFFERENTIAL EXPENSES AND THEIR EFFECT ON ALPHA
AND DIFFERENTIAL ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE
For various categories of funds, this table shows averages of differential returns (fund return minus benchmark return) and betas from a
regression of fund excess return on benchmark excess return, multi-index alphas, and the effect on differential returns of fund betas not
being equal to 1 or of additional influences beyond a single-index model.
Differential
Category Obs Return
All Funds 531 0.001% 0.048% 0.952 -0.046% -0.001%
All Funds; Internal Advisor 372 0.048% 0.068% 0.961 -0.032% 0.012%
All Funds; External Advisor 103 -0.087% 0.027% 0.944 -0.060% -0.054%
Common Stock 411 -0.028% 0.040% 0.964 -0.058% -0.010%
Common Stock; Internal Advisor 295 0.018% 0.055% 0.971 -0.045% 0.008%
Common Stock; External Advisor 68 -0.106% 0.033% 0.952 -0.078% -0.060%
International 87 0.182% 0.127% 0.866 -0.003% 0.057%
International; Internal Advisor 62 0.225% 0.173% 0.891 0.017% 0.034%
International; External Advisor 17 0.031% 0.054% 0.851 -0.024% 0.001%
TABLE IV
DIFFERENTIAL RETURNS AND THEIR DETERMINANTS
Change In Return Due To
Multi-Index Average Beta Not Additional
Alpha Beta Equal To 1 Influences
This table shows, for various categories of incentive-fee funds, the average R2 and beta from a regression of fund excess return on benchmark
excess return, along with the average of the tracking error (the variance of the fund return minus the benchmark return). Differential measures
are also shown, where each differential is the difference between the incentive-fee-sample measure and the matched non-incentive-fee sample
measure. For the non-incentive-fee sample, the averages (based on a regression using an index determined by style analysis) are as follows:
All Funds: obs = 2113, R2 = 0.855, beta = 0.916, tracking error variance = 3.423; Common Stock: obs = 1638, R2 = 0.860, beta = 0.919,
tracking error variance = 3.304; International: obs = 343, R2 = 0.814, beta = 0.889, tracking error variance = 5.047. Reported significance
levels for differential (incentive-fee sample minus matched non-incentive-fee sample) averages and differences in means are based on one-tailed tests.
* = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 10% level.
Category Obs
All Funds 531 0.795 -0.060 * 0.952 0.037 * 4.680 1.256 *
All Funds; Internal Advisor 372 0.796 -0.055 * 0.961 0.044 * 4.566 1.060 *
All Funds; External Advisor 103 0.854 -0.015 0.944 0.034 * 3.192 0.216
Difference In Means (Internal - External) -0.058 * 0.017 1.374 **
Common Stock 411 0.781 -0.079 * 0.964 0.046 * 4.917 1.616 *
Common Stock; Internal Advisor 295 0.784 -0.074 * 0.971 0.049 * 4.679 1.383 *
Common Stock; External Advisor 68 0.825 -0.043 ** 0.952 0.051 * 3.968 0.802
Difference In Means (Internal - External) -0.041 ** 0.019 0.711
International 87 0.817 0.003 0.866 -0.023 5.149 0.104
International; Internal Advisor 62 0.839 0.026 ** 0.891 0.001 4.945 -0.142
International; External Advisor 17 0.865 0.049 * 0.851 -0.037 *** 3.208 -1.794 *
Difference In Means (Internal - External) -0.026 *** 0.040 1.737 **
TABLE V
AVERAGE R2s, BETAS AND VARIANCES OF TRACKING ERROR
Differential
R2
Fee Sample
Beta
Fee Sample Differential
Tracking Error Variance
Fee Sample Differential
For common stock incentive-fee funds with 36-month rolling fees, this table shows the monthly average fund return minus the
monthly average benchmark return during a prior two-year period ("period 1"), the average variance of that difference for the
following one-year period ("period 2") and the average percentage increase in the variance of that difference for period 2. The funds
are ranked by their period-1 two-year monthly average return differences. Reported significance levels based on one-tailed tests.
 * = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 10% level.
NUMBER OF
TOP 20% 55 0.488% 3.786 24.22%
ALL 277 -0.053% 4.318 43.35%
BOTTOM 20% 55 -0.669% 6.327 58.06%
TOP 20% - BOTTOM 20% 1.157% * -2.541 * -33.84% ***
TABLE VI
RISK POSTURE AS A FRACTION OF PREVIOUS PERFORMANCE
AVERAGE FUND AVERAGE PERCENTAGE
TWO-YEAR RETURN MINUS VARIANCE IN INCREASE IN
FUND PERIODS BENCHMARK RETURN NEXT 12 MONTHS VARIANCE
This table shows cross-sectional regression results using the Sirri and Tufano (Journal of Finance ,
October 1998) regression model with the addition of dummy variables for incentive-fee funds (Fee Dummy)
and years (1997 Dummy and 1998 Dummy) across 3,371 fund observations and 3 years (1997, 1998 and 
1999). The sample consists of all "aggressive growth" "long-term growth" and "growth and income" funds, 
as classified by ICDI in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database, with data spanning 1996-1999.
The dependent variable is the year t growth rate of net new money for fund i , defined as
 (TNA i, t  - TNA i, t- 1 * (1 + R i, t )) / TNA i, t- 1, where TNA i, t  is fund i' s total net assets at the end of
year t  and R i, t  is the raw return of fund i in year t . In addition to the dummy variables, the independent
variables include the log of fund i 's total net assets at the end of the prior year (Log Lag TNA), the growth
rate in year t  of net new money for all sample funds in the same investment category as fund i
(Flow To Category), the volatility of the prior year's monthly returns of fund i  (Lagged Risk), the level of
total fees (expense ratio plus load) charged by the fund in year t  - 1 for an investor with a seven-year holding
period (Lagged Fee), and measures of the fractional performance rank of fund i  in the prior year. A fund's
fractional rank (RANKt ) is its percentile performance based on its year t  raw return relative to other funds in
that year and in that fund's category, and ranges from 0 to 1. The funds are then divided into quintiles based
on their prior-year rankings. For example, the 5th or lowest performance quintile (Lowperf) is defined as 
Min[0.2, RANKt -1], the 4th performance quintile (4thperf) is defined as Min[0.2, RANKt- 1 - Lowperf], etc.,
up to the highest performance quintile (Highperf).
Coefficient t Stat
Intercept 0.035 0.347
Log Lag TNA -0.060 -7.718
Flow To Category 1.047 3.481
Lagged Risk -1.469 -1.785
Lagged Fee 2.956 1.442
Lowperf 0.647 1.908
4thperf 0.495 1.822
3rdperf 0.568 2.127
2ndperf 0.828 3.047
Highperf 3.420 10.145
Fee Dummy 0.101 2.015
1997 Dummy -0.092 -0.974
1998 Dummy -0.048 -1.124
AND INCENTIVE FEE DUMMY
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS: 3731
NUMBER OF INCENTIVE-FEE FUND OBSERVATIONS: 210
ADJUSTED R2: 0.179
TABLE VII
NEW FLOWS AND INCENTIVE FEES:
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION OF NET CASH FLOW ON NET ASSETS,
CATEGORY FLOWS, RISK, EXPENSES, PERFORMANCE
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1  For an opposing view see Admati & Pfleiderer (1997). 
2  The importance and size of these biases have been analyzed for one type of private partnership, publicly 
offered commodity bonds. See Elton, Gruber and Rentzler (1989). 
3  There are rare occurrences of funds that do not have symmetrical fees, e.g., the Accessor Funds. 
Conversations with the SEC indicate that while they are aware of this, they have not as yet taken any action. 
4  A high watermark means that incentive fees are not paid until any negative performance incurred in the 
past is made up. 
5  There were no incentive fee money market funds, so comparisons are with non-money-market funds.  
When a fund has multiple classes shares, we use the longest existing class in all subsequent analyses. 
6  In a recent article, Christofferson (2001) examines the use of fee waivers by money market funds as a way 
for management to link fees to performance.  The impact of implicit incentive fees versus the use of fee waivers to 
link fees and performance is an interesting topic for future research. 
7  There is one influence, although minor in size, that could cause a fund manager to have a beta below one. 
Recognizing that most funds pay compensation on a rolling 12- or 36-month return, beating a benchmark is 
equivalent to stating that the geometric mean over the 12 or 36 months is higher for the fund than for the index. The 
geometric mean depends on the arithmetic mean and arithmetic variance. The higher the arithmetic mean and the 
lower the variance, the higher the geometric mean. Thus a manager with an incentive fee could increase the 
probability of having a higher geometric mean by having a lower arithmetic variance than the benchmark. This 
would suggest a beta less than one. 
 
8  Ross (2000) argues that utility functions exist for which above some risk level the manager is better off 
with less variance and the commensurate lower expected fees. Carpenter (2000) makes a similar argument. 
9  In our sample there were 22 changes of managers in the 28 funds with external managers, and 22 changes 
out of 80 internally managed. 
10  We examined the holdings and strategies of these funds, and some we initially selected were discarded and 
replaced by new randomly selected funds. We replaced funds if they had an investment strategy very different from 
the funds in our sample. This involved either extensive use of options, hedge funds, funds engaged in major market 
timing, or holding assets such as real estate not present in our sample. Finally, we discarded without replacement a 
few funds which invested in a single country or single industry because none of the incentive fee funds followed 
such a strategy.  
11  In examining all tables, the reader should note that the number of fund months identified as internal and 
external add to a smaller number than the total fund months examined.  In the early years of our sample, some funds 
could not be identified as having internal or external managers.  
12  For example, we grouped funds into the one-third that would earn the highest incentive component of the 
fee if performance exceeded the benchmark by 1% and the one-third with the lowest. We repeated this for 2%, 3% 
and 4%, and also for all ranges we divided the funds into top and bottom halves. 
13  Elton, Gruber, Das & Hlavka (1993) have shown that over one 20-year period the smallest decile of stocks 
would have a risk-adjusted excess return relative to the S&P benchmark of 12.81% per year.  
14  See Elton, Gruber and Blake (1999) for evidence and a detailed description of the indexes. 
15  For a detailed description see Blake, Elton and Gruber (1993). 
16  The results overstate the alphas on the non-incentive funds, for they include some small funds from the 
CRSP data set that are subject to omission bias (see Elton, Gruber and Blake (2001)). 
17  They would do much better than a set of index funds with the same risk because index funds have expenses 
that lower their performance below the indexes they follow.  In addition, as shown in equation (1), variable fees 
effect the after fee beta and, consequently, the alpha.  How big is this effect?  Since most betas were less than one, 
the effect of variable fees is to reduce beta (see equation (7)).  However, since the average beta was close to one, the 
net effect was miniscule.  
18  This is despite the fact that, as shown in the next section, incentive-fee funds take large bets on other 
indexes.   
19  Some non-incentive-fee funds also declare a benchmark they are trying to beat. Investors in these funds 
also have a risk that the fund does not follow its stated policy. The difference is twofold. First, all incentive-fee 
funds have a declared benchmark, and only some non-incentive-fee funds do. Second, incentive fee funds not only 
declare a benchmark, but are compensated depending on their performance relative to it. Thus investors should 
logically have a stronger belief about the fund’s objective for incentive-fee funds and be hurt much more if the fund 
deviates from it. 
20  All regressions are computed over a three-year period.  The candidates for inclusion in style analysis were 
those used in determining the multi-index alphas. 
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21  We selected funds with a 36-month evaluation period so that we could have a sufficient period to estimate 
variances. We examine a different phenomenon than that of the tournament literature of Brown, Harlow & Starks 
(1996), because that literature hypothesizes an increase in risk within a year in order for a fund to look good in 
yearly evaluation services, and we are discussing risk changes across years. 
22  We could have selected other periods, but since managers typically do an analysis of their portfolio at year-
end (after window dressing), this seemed like a good decision point to examine.  The analysis might seem naïve in 
that we have not considered the impact of the decision made for the final twelve months on the following incentive 
computation that would include these twelve months.  However, it is easy to show that, if management had no 
special information, increasing or decreasing risk does not impact the expected value of future compensation. 
23  This is not necessarily inconsistent with Chevalier and Ellison.  Chevalier and Ellison have shown 
increased risk taking in the last quarter of a year caused by funds attempting to adjust their performance for that 
year.  Our paper deals with risk taking from one year to the next. 
24  The results for average variance for top 20%, all, and bottom 20% of incentive fee funds are 3.713, 4.163 
and 6.054, and for percentage increase are 24.73%, 57.14% and 99.14% respectively. These are more statistically 
significant than the 24-month/12-month split results.  For non-incentive fee funds the average variance for the top 
20%, all, and bottom 20% are 4.88, 3.63, and 4.55 and for percentage increases are 41.52%, 67.00%, and 52.60%. 
25  See Sirri and Tufano for exact definitions of each variable. A fund is included in our incentive-fee sample 
and has a dummy of one if, at the beginning of the year for which we compute cash flows, it had an incentive fee. 
